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WILL CONTRACTS: CONTRACT RIGHTS IN
CONFLICT WITH SPOUSAL RIGHTS
Orley R. Lilly, Jr.*
Professor Lilly analyzes thepostmortem conflict of claims to prop-
erty between a decedent's surviving spouse and a thirdparty benefciary
of an antenuptial will contract, the terms of which denypropery to the
surviving spouse. He reviews the most frequently encountered types of
will contracts and the courts' attempts to distinguish them or avoid their
enforcement. Also examined is the courts' distinction between a will
contract promisingfuture legacies to thirdparty beneficiaries and a will
contract which immediately vests property rights in such benefciaries.
After discussing the reluctance of courts to rely on public policy to re-
solve conflicts between will contract rights and spousal rights, Professor
Lilly concludes that legislatures now have the opportunity to formulate
that policy. Until that is done, courts can adopt uniform rules of con-
struction which effectuate the probable intentions of the contracting
parties.
I. INTRODUCTION: CREATING THE CONFLICT
Few would deny that estate planning by husband and wife is desir-
able, and the law makes available to them several devices to accom-
plish that end. As is often the case with alternatives, and especially in
the law, selection of one may accomplish every goal and selection of
another, as things turn out, may give rise to serious complications with
undesired effects.
Let us suppose two similar couples. Husband and wife are in their
twilight years with no issue to survive them. Their principal estate
planning goal is to make an irrevocable agreement providing for the
disposition to the collateral relatives of both of whatever property re-
mains after their deaths. For both couples the goal is a desirable one;
each chooses, however, a different method to accomplish the goal.
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A., 1954, Southwestern at
Memphis (Rhodes College); J.D., 1966, Washington University (St. Louis); LL.M., 1969, The Uni-
versity of Illinois.
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The first couple transfers inter vivos all of their property, I however
title is held, into a trust, subject to these limitations:
(1) During their joint lifetimes, they reserve the rights to revoke,
to receive all net income and to invade corpus without restriction;
(2) After the first settlor dies, the trust becomes irrevocable, but
the survivor has the right to receive all net income and to invade corpus
without restriction;
(3) After the second settlor dies, the corpus is to be divided
among designated collateral relatives of both settlors.
The second couple chooses to use a postnuptial contract rather
than an inter vivos trust. The dispositive provisions of the contract will
closely resemble similar provisions of the first couple's trust. The con-
tract will also require, however, execution of wills with legacies con-
forming to the contract and will provide that the contract and wills may
be revoked by agreement of both husband and wife, but not otherwise.
Both methods seem to solve the couples' estate planning problems
and both appear to be valid.2 Suppose, however, that the circum-
stances turn out to be somewhat different than the couples expected at
the time the estate plans were effectuated. Suppose, for example, that
in both cases the husband died, the wife remarried and then she died,
survived by her second husband. The question arises: What effects on
the statutory rights of the surviving husbands do the trust and contract
estate plan arrangements have?
In the trust situation, the widower's rights relate only to assets in
the decedent wife's administered estate. In relation to that estate, he
may assert whatever claims he has of homestead, exempt property and
family allowances, dower, curtesy or forced share. The dollar value of
these rights, and particularly that of the forced share right, is by hy-
pothesis likely to be very small.3
The widower would like to be able to exercise his forced share
election right against the property embraced within the trust. General
law is clear, however, that trust assets are not includible in the dece-
dent's administered estate and that they cannot be reached by exercis-
1. Household and personal items and sums in checking accounts are usually not included in
this type of trust, but are instead left to be disposed of by will or an intestacy statute.
2. The contract may be void if it is governed by the law of a place which has a strong public
policy condemning postnuptial contracts which reduce postmortem statutory rights of the surviv-
ing spouse. The contract probably would be void in Oklahoma. See generally Lilly, Oklahoma'r
Troublesome Coverture Property Concept, 11 TULSA L.J. 1 (1975).
3. See supra note I.
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ing the forced share right; nor can they be reached under the Uniform
Probate Code's broader "augmented estate" concept.4 Moreover, ante-
nuptial knowledge of the trust, or lack of knowledge, does not alter the
fact that the rights of the trust's remainder beneficiaries antedate and
prevail over any claim of the surviving second spouse to the trust
property.
No answer is so clear in the contract situation in spite of the fact
that our contract couple probably expected the same result as that in
the trust situation. Whereas there are two separate estates in the case of
the trust, it is clear in the contract case that there is but one estate-that
of the decedent. It is to that estate only that all claims of any type
whatever must relate. As a result, the claims of contract beneficiaries
and of a surviving spouse may be in conflict.
Otherwise, and unfortunately, the law is not clear. Not only has
there been a "confused intermingling"5 by lawyers and judges of prop-
erty, estates and contract law, but there has also been a "tendency of
the courts to extend preferential treatment to the rights of spouses"6 on
the basis of less than satisfactory reasoning and in face of established
legal principles which appear in some cases to dictate otherwise.
Results in decided cases are not uniform. There is even less uni-
formity in the reasoning used in reaching those results. Outcomes may
turn, for example, on whether the decedent's will is or is not in compli-
ance with the contract, or whether the surviving spouse has or does not
have antenuptial knowledge of the contract. Court views of public pol-
icy often also play an important role in determining superiority of
rights.
This writing explores the problems encountered when there is a
postmortem conflict of claims to property between a decedent's surviv-
ing spouse and a third party beneficiary of an antenuptial will contract
which, if enforced, would deny property to the surviving spouse.
4. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982). The transfer of property to the trustee occurred
prior to the surviving spouse's marriage.
There probably is no statute in any Anglo-American jurisdiction which would extend the
forced share right to this hypothetical trust.
5. E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 181 (3d ed. 1981).
6. B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 167 (1956).
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II. CLASSIFICATIONS OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY WILL
CONTRACTS
There probably is no "typical" third party beneficiary will con-
tract. Since, however, contracts address problems, it is possible to
classify these contracts by categories based on the particular problems
addressed.
The most frequently encountered will contract, like our hypotheti-
cal one, has as its purpose the planning of an estate. Typically, in order
to settle in their lifetimes the postmortem disposition of their property,
spouses7 agree that all of their property, however title is taken, is jointly
acquired, that the survivor of them takes all of the property of the first
of them to die and that all of the property of the survivor shall descend
in a manner specified. These dispositions frequently are to common
issue of the spouses,8 to the spouses' issue resulting from previous mar-
riages,9 or to designated collateral relatives of each of the spouses.'0
The survivor's right to use and dispose of the property may be practi-
cally unrestricted or more narrowly circumscribed." The contract will
provide that it and the conforming wills can be revoked only by mutual
agreement of the parties to it,'2 and, ideally, the contract is in writing. ' 3
The second most frequently encountered type of will contract re-
sults from reaching agreement on property settlement prior to divorce
or separation. Typically in this type of contract, a spouse will agree to
execute a will which devises property to the other spouse,' 4 to issue of
the marriage,'" or to issue of that marriage and any later one.' 6 The
contract may even be incorporated into the court decree in a case.' 7
A third category is comprised of contracts utilized to facilitate an
adoption. In order to obtain consent to an adoption from the natural
parents, the adopting parents agree that the child shall be their "heir"
7. It is clear that any two or more persons, married or not, may utilize a will contract for
estate planning purposes. The typical contract is, however, between spouses.
8. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 P. 421 (1919).
9. See, e.g., Estate of Stewart, 69 Cal. 2d 296, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 349 P.2d 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1960).
11. Compare, e.g., Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S.W.2d 350 (1935) (survivor given full and
unrestricted right to use and enjoyment of property) with Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 349
P.2d 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1960) (implied is covenant of survivor not to make unreasonable use of
property).
12. See, e.g., Keats v. Cates, 100 Ill. App. 2d 177, 241 N.E.2d 645 (1968).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
14. See Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941).
15. See, e.g., In re Estate of Beauchamp, 115 Ariz. 219, 564 P.2d 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
16. See, e.g., Reid v. Asanovic, 224 Cal. App. 2d 632, 36 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1964).
17. See, e.g., In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sur. Ct. 1940).
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and agree to execute wills devising their property to the child. 8 A vari-
ant in this category relates to children born out of wedlock. In consid-
eration of forbearance of legal action, a natural father may agree with
the natural mother that the child shall be his "heir" and agree to exe-
cute a will devising property to the child. 19
Finally, there are "services" contracts, which occasionally, though
not usually, contemplate third party beneficiaries. In such a contract, a
principal party may agree to provide services in consideration of the
other party's agreement to devise property to a third person.2
In all of the foregoing circumstances a contract is not only a lawful
means, but also an apparently appropriate means of accomplishing re-
sults desired by the parties. Assuming that at the time of contracting
there is no infringement of existing rights of persons not parties to it,
the will contract is consistent with public policy and valid.2' Once any
right of rescission is extinguished, the rights of a third party beneficiary
in the subject matter of the contract clearly are vested,22 and the benefi-
ciary should be able to enforce those rights according to the contract's
terms. Only in cases where the law accords supervening rights in the
subject matter of the contract to another person may full enforcement
of the third party rights properly be denied. 3
III. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE CONFLICT
The 1769 English case of Dufour v. Pereira24 is the leading author-
ity on enforceability by a third party donee beneficiary of rights under
a will contract. Husband and wife executed a joint will by which the
residuary estate of each was pooled into one common fund and be-
queathed to the survivor for life with limitations over."
After the husband died, his widow probated the joint will and ac-
cepted the benefits it provided her. She subsequently executed a new
will which was inconsistent with the joint will. After her death, benefi-
ciaries under the joint will sued to obtain the benefits it provided them.
18. See, e.g., Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923).
19. See, e.g., Moore's Adm'r v. Wagers' Adm'r, 243 Ky. 351, 48 S.W.2d 15 (1932).
20. See Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939).
21. See 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1375 (1962).
22. See 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 396 (W. Jaeger 3d ed.
1959).
23. See 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 21, at § 782 (1951).
24. 1 Dickens 419, 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (Ch. 1769). A better report of the case is in Re Oldham,
[1925] 1 Ch. 75 (Ch. 1924).
25. Re Oldham, [1925] 1 Ch. 75, 84 (Ch. 1924).
1984]
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Applying third party beneficiary enforcement principles, the chancellor
stated of the first will:
It might have been revoked by both jointly; it might have been
revoked separately, provided the party intending it, had given notice
to the other of such revocation.
But I cannot be of opinion, that either of them, could, during
their joint lives, do it secretly; or that after the death of either, it
could be done by the survivor by another will.
It is a contract between the parties, which cannot be rescinded,
but by the consent of both. The first that dies, carries his part of the
contract into execution. Will the Court afterwards permit the other
to break the contract? Certainly not.26
It is clear in Dufour that only general third party beneficiary en-
forcement principles were of concern to the court: no rights of a surviv-
ing spouse were at issue.
Dufour principles are applicable in surviving spouse cases, how-
ever, and have been applied in England as recently as 1950. In In re
Green27 the survivor husband's last will purported to confer greater
benefits upon his second wife than permitted by the mutual and con-
tractual wills of himself and his first wife. Following Dufour, the chan-
cellor held that a trust in favor of the third party beneficiaries attached
to the property embraced within the terms of the interspousal con-
tract.2 The strength of the Green holding may, however, be weakened
because of the chancellor's interpretation that the husband's contract
with his first wife permitted him to devise a substantial portion of his
estate to his second wife.29
Rubenstein v. Mueller, ° a 1967 New York case, is perhaps the
strongest case upholding third party beneficiary rights in the face of a
challenge by a surviving second spouse. Mueller and his first wife exe-
cuted a joint will which provided that the survivor take the estate of the
first to die and stated further that "the estate of the second decedent
...is hereby bequeathed [to named beneficiaries]." ' 31 After the first
wife died, Mueller remarried and later died after having executed a will
naming his second wife as his sole beneficiary. After this last will was
26. Dufour v. Pereira, 21 Eng. Rep. 332, 333 (Ch. 1769).
27. [1951] 1 Ch. 148 (Ch. 1950).
28. See id at 156 (by implication). The point is clearer in the report of Green in [19501 2 All
E.R. 913, 919 (Ch.).
29. See [1951] 1 Ch. at 155.
30. 19 N.Y.2d 228, 225 N.E.2d 540, 278 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1967).
31. Id at 232, 225 N.E.2d at 542, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
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admitted to probate, a beneficiary named in the earlier joint will com-
menced an action seeking its specific enforcement as a contract.
The right of ownership'to only two significant items of property
was in issue. First, there was real property which Mueller and his first
wife had owned as tenants by the entirety and which had ripened into
sole ownership because of his survival. The other item was a joint
bank account which was in his and his second wife's names but which
was funded with money he received as surviving owner of joint ac-
counts with his first wife. Concurring with the result in the two lower
courts, the Court of Appeals of New York agreed unanimously that the
joint will constituted a binding agreement which transformed the
spouses' collective property into a life interest in the survivor with the
power to consume principal. A majority of the court rejected the argu-
ment that New York's public policy would be frustrated by sustaining a
testamentary arrangement which denies a widow a distributive share in
her husband's estate. Instead, the court held that Mueller had no inter-
est in the property against which his widow's right of election could
operate and affirmed the trial court's order that the provisions of the
joint will be specifically performed.
Mueller is not alone in recognizing priority of third party benefici-
ary rights when they antedated a second marriage. When confronted
with the same issue as in Mueller, courts in California,
32 Illinois,33
Iowa,34 Kansas,35 Kentucky36 and Wisconsin37 have reached the same
result about priority as did the New York court. On the other hand,
courts in Florida,38 Oregon 39 and Washington40 have given priority to
the rights of the surviving spouse.
Although it would appear that courts would give in other contexts
the same priority to antecedent third party beneficiary rights that they
do in husband-wife estate plan cases, they do not necessarily do so. In
32. See Estate of Stewart, 69 Cal. 2d 296, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968); Brewer v.
Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 349 P.2d 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1960).
33. See Keats v. Cates, 100 I11. App. 2d 177, 241 N.E.2d 645 (1968).
34. See Tiemann v. Kampmeier, 252 Iowa 587, 107 N.W.2d 689 (1961); Baker v. Syfritt, 147
Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910).
35. See Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 P. 421 (1919).
36. See Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S.W.2d 350 (1935).
37. See Estate of Chayka, 40 Wis. 2d 715, 162 N.W.2d 632 (1968), qa"d, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176
N.W.2d 561 (1970).
38. See Tod v. Fuller, 78 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1955); cf. Fuller v. Tod, 63 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1953)
(trial court erred in disallowing lack of notice of the contract as a trial issue).
39. See Patecky v. Friend, 220 Or. 612, 350 P.2d 170 (1960).
40. See In re Estate of Arland, 131 Wash. 297, 230 P. 157 (1924).
1984]
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cases of will contracts agreed upon as part of a property settlement in
contemplation of divorce or separation, courts in California4 I and Kan-
sas42 have determined the priority to be the same as in estate plan cases.
The priority appears to be reversed, however, in the courts of two
states. Surrogates in New York frequently have held that settlement
contract beneficiaries are legatees, not creditors, and that a surviving
spouse's statutory forced share has priority in such a case. 3 The court
of appeals has viewed settlement contracts as calling for a future legacy
and not as creating an irrevocable obligation concerning collective
property of the divorcing spouses." The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
has said that it is both inequitable and against the state's public policy
to deny a widow dower and a forced share, at least when she had no
knowledge of the property settlement contract.45
It is not surprising that courts have distinguished among categories
of will contracts in order to find an apparently reasonable basis on
which to confer priority in postmortem benefits upon a surviving
spouse. After all, only one common law property state does not pro-
vide that a surviving spouse has a type of statutory forced heirship in
the property of the decedent spouse.4 6 What is perhaps surprising is
that courts have so frequently accorded preeminence to third party
beneficiary rights.
IV. CONFLICT AVOIDANCE OR EVASION
The study of a substantial number of cases is convincing that
courts are reluctant to deny property to a surviving spouse when to do
so gives priority to third party beneficiary contract rights. As a conse-
quence of this reluctance, the courts have utilized several methods and
41. See Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941). But ef. Reid v.
Asanovic, 224 Cal. App. 2d 632, 36 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1964) (contract allowed reasonable gifts to
second wife).
42. See In re Estate of Davis, 171 Kan. 605, 237 P.2d 396 (1951).
43. See, e.g., In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sur. Ct. 1940), cited With
approyalin Rubenstein v.Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 234, 225 N.E.2d 540, 544, 278 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850
(1967).
44. See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 234, 225 N.E.2d 540, 544, 278 N.Y.S.2d 845,
850 (1967) (dictum). It should not be inferred from the New York cases that present property
rights cannot possibly be created in third party beneficiaries of settlement contracts.
45. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 114, 184 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944).
46. See E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, JR., supra note 5, at 82. South Dakota has abolished
dower and curtesy without providing a forced share. S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-3 (1976).
The eight community property states do not provide forced shares. There, "the main protection is
the spouse's one-half interest in the community property." E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, JR., supra
note 5, at 82.
[Vol. 20:197
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theories which allow them to avoid finding or having to enforce a con-
tract which would produce the undesired effects.
A. Evidence is Insufficient to Establish a Contract
A legitimate means of inhibiting claims of the existence of will
contracts is to establish high evidentiary requirements. If those re-
quirements cannot be met, there is no provable contract to conflict with
postmortem spousal rights.
Frequently, statutes require that all contracts relating to succession
must at least be evidenced by a writing. Section 2-701 of the Uniform
Probate Code is typical in that it "requires that either the will must set
forth the material provisions of the contract, or the will must make
express reference to the contract and extrinsic evidence prove the terms
of the contract, or there must be a separate writing signed by the dece-
dent evidencing the contract. '4 7 In some states, statutes which require
written contracts for the "sale" of real property have been broadly in-
terpreted to be applicable in cases of agreements concerning succession
if real property is included in the bargain.48
It is clear that many states do not require a contract to be in writ-
ing, merely because it relates to succession, when its subject matter is
personal property. These states, however, do not often make proof of a
contract concerning succession easy. Evidence of such a contract is
frequently required to be "clear and convincing."4 9 "Dead man" stat-
utes50 and statutes declaring spouses incompetent to testify for or
against each other' may make proof of an oral will contract practically
impossible. In addition, if a relative is a party to the contract, a pre-
sumption of gratuitous performance of services may be encountered. 2
The reporter systems are replete with reports of cases in which
contracts concerning succession have not been proved because of insuf-
ficiency of evidence. That usual result is appropriate. As one court has
aptly pointed out, "[i]t would be easy to destroy all wills if [less
47. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701 comment (1982).
48. See, e.g., Foster v. Barton, 365 P.2d 714,717 (Okla. 1961) (quoting B. SPARKS, supra note
6, at 42).
49. See B. SPARKS, supra note 6, at 24 & n.6.
50. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 384 (1971) (repealed 1978).
51. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. fit. 12, § 385.3 (1971) (repealed 1978).
52. See E. ScOLEs & E. HALBACH, JR., supra note 5, at 182.
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than clear and convincing oral] evidence were held sufficient for the
purpose . . .-.
There are, on the other hand, a number of cases reported in which
contracts were found to exist where one may well question whether the
clear and convincing standard was in fact met.5 4 These findings occur
with some frequency in cases of joint or mutual wills. 55
B. Joint or Mutual Wills Do Not Presume a Contract
The execution by husband and wife of a joint will 5 6 or the pres-
ence of contemporaneous or near contemporaneous mutual wills with
reciprocal provisions does not give rise to a presumption that they were
made pursuant to a contract. That is the "clear weight of authority"
and the "sounder view."' 57 Though originally judge-made, the rule has
been included in the Uniform Probate Code.58
The English case of Re Oldham 9 is typical. The decedents had,
while married, executed mutual wills with identical terms in favor of
each other. The court rejected the argument that the mere existence of
the mutual wills eliminated the necessity of proving a contract between
the spouses.6 ° The court reasoned that the wills indicated only that the
53. Alban v. Schnieders, 67 Ohio App. 397, 403, 34 N.E.2d 302, 304 (1940).
A contract may not, in fact, be intended by the parties. One court seems to have held that the
survivor's rights to deal with property are so unrestricted that no contract was made. See In re
Lowe's Estate, 24 App. Div. 2d 983, 265 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1965), a f'dmera sub nom. In re Estate of
Zeh, 18 N.Y.2d 900, 223 N.E.2d 43, 276 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1966).
54. See, eg., Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E.2d 568 (1945); Cummings v.
Sherman, 16 Wash. 2d 88, 132 P.2d 998 (1943).
55. The courts do not always display the desired amount of diligence in the application
of the "clear and convincing" rule and this tendency becomes especially pronounced
when they are confronted with the wills of two or more persons which, when considered
together, show on their face, by their reciprocal provisions or otherwise, that they were
intended as part of one integrated scheme or plan.. . . Where wills of this kind are
concerned the courts still give verbal adherence to the rule that clear and convincing
evidence is required to prove the existence of a contract, but an examination of the re-
sults reached raises a very real question as to the exactitude with which the rule is ap-
plied. When two people execute a common document as the will of each of them or
when they execute separate documents at approximately the same time and in identical
or almost identical language there is a tendency to pass too easily to the conclusion that
such action must have been the result of a contract.
B. SPARKS, supra note 6, at 26-27.
56. It is clear that joint wills may be executed by any two or more persons; in fact, they are
usually utilized by spouses only.
57. See B. SPARKs, supra note 6, at 27.
58. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701 (1982): "The execution of a joint will or mutual wills
does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills." Colorado had a
similar statute which predated her adoption of the Code. See 1953 Colo. Sess. Laws 672.
59. [1925] 1 Ch. 75 (Ch. 1924).
60. See id at 87.
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spouses had agreed to make them in identical terms; that the wills were
contractual in nature would have to be proved.6' Professor Sparks has
said that nothing more is revealed than
that the parties must have talked the matter over and must have ar-
rived at an understanding or agreement concerning their testamen-
tary dispositions. Such discussions and such understandings between
persons of close affinities, especially between husbands and wives,
are not unusual and the fact that they have taken place is no indica-
tion that there has been any thought of a binding contract.62
Not all states have adopted the "sounder view," however. Six de-
cades ago the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:
The fact that these [mutual and reciprocal] wills constitute but a sin-
gle document, that they were executed at the same time, that each of
the testators knew of the provisions made in the will of the other...
conclusively indicates that the two wills resulted from a mutual
agreement between the testators and that their provisions were in ac-
cord with such prior agreement.63
As recently as 1968, the same court recognized that a joint will raises a
presumption that it is executed pursuant to a contract, though that pre-
sumption may be rebutted by evidence. 64 Mutuality in contemporane-
ous husband-wife wills appears to call for an assumption that they are
contractual in nature in Iowa,65 Kansas,66 Kentucky,67 and New
York.68 Professors Scoles and Halbach have noted, as a recent trend,
"that many courts have been increasingly willing to imply a contract
merely from the jointness or similarity of the wills of spouses, with little
or no extrinsic evidence of contractual intention. '69 Although the re-
cent cases do not present a contract-forced share conflict, that contracts
61. Seeid. at 87-89.
62. B. SPARKS, supra note 6, at 27-28.
63. Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 608, 198 N.W. 763, 766 (1924).
"[A] contract to make mutual and reciprocal wills may be conclusively presumed or inferred
from the provisions of the wills themselves, especially f there is ajointly executed will." Estate of
Chayka, 40 Wis. 2d at 717, 162 N.W.2d at 634 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
64. Estate of Chayka, 40 Wis. 2d at 717, 162 N.W.2d at 634.
65. See Tiemann v. Kampmeier, 252 Iowa 587, 107 N.W.2d 689 (1961); Baker v. Syfritt, 147
Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910).
66. See Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 P. 421 (1919).
67. See Boner's Adm'x v. Chesnut's Ex'r, 317 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1958); Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky.
1, 79 S.W.2d 350 (1935).
68. See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 225 N.E.2d 540, 278 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1967);
Olsen v. Olsen, 189 Misc. 1046, 70 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
69. E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, JR, supra note 5, at 190, where the authors cite the following
cases: In re Estate of Maloney, 178 Ind. App. 191, 381 N.E.2d 1263 (1978); Woelke v. Calfee, 45
Or. App. 459, 608 P.2d 606 (1980); Pruitt v. Moss, 271 S.C. 305, 247 S.E.2d 324 (1978); Fisher v.
Capp, 597 S.W.2d 393 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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are more readily found because of relaxed proof requirements will no
doubt more frequently give rise to conflicts in future cases.
C. Contract is Interpreted to Avoid Conflict
When a contract's existence cannot be avoided, either because it is
in writing or because the evidence of it is clear and convincing, the
contract may not, in fact, create a conflict with forced share or other
rights by its literal terms or by interpretation.
1. Some Property Not Covered by the Contract
The English case of In re Green70 is illustrative of interpretation
problems which may face a court. Husband and wife had little prop-
erty of their own other than a vested reversionary interest, subject to
another's life estate. The reversion was given to them in equal shares
or to the survivor if only one survived the life tenant. The spouses exe-
cuted mutual wills which referred to the reversion 7' and which were
deemed contractual by the court.72 The wife died before the life tenant,
and the husband remarried. He executed a second will which made
some bequests different from those in his first will and which left the
residue to his second wife.73
In a suit by the executor for instructions, the court had to interpret
provisions in the contractual will which applied in case the testator's
first wife did not survive him. His estate was to be divided into half-
shares, "one. .. half-share. . shall be considered as my own per-
sonal estate as distinct from the other half-share which shall be consid-
ered as equivalent to any benefit I have received by the previous death
of my wife or by reason of her predeceasing [the life tenant]. 74 The
first half-share was to be distributed among one group of specified indi-
viduals and charities; the second half-share was to be distributed
among a different group of specified individuals and charities.75
The court interpreted the will contract as not covering the hus-
70. [1951] Ch. 148 (Ch. 1950).
71. The testator. . . referred to their interests in reversion, and recited that they had
similarly agreed to carry out the terms of each other's wills as to these interests, in the
event of only one of them surviving the tenant for life, and succeeding to the whole
estate, just as if both had survived.
Id at 149.
72. See id. at 154.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 151.
75. Id
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band's half-share: "the husband's moiety was his own personal prop-
erty to do as he liked with .... 76 Thus a conflict was avoided
because there was property in the husband's estate which his second
will could properly leave to his second wife. Only the first wife's half-
share was bound to the terms of the will contract.77
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Florey v. Meeker,7" was con-
fronted with the necessity of interpreting a contractual joint will to de-
termine whether the surviving husband alone could by codicil change
will provisions to provide for his second wife. While she was alive, the
first wife and the husband had changed one provision of the joint will
by a codicil they both executed. After her death and his remarriage,
the husband alone executed a codicil purporting to devise five-eighths
of his residuary estate to his second wife. After that codicil was admit-
ted to probate along with the joint will, three of his five original residu-
ary legatees brought an action claiming that the husband's codicil
breached the contract.
In reviewing the trial court's decision that there was no breach, the
supreme court exhaustively examined the provision of the joint will
which stated that the husband
may from time to time, by codicil to this will, executed by him in
accordance with the statute, substitute other devises [sic] and legatees
for the five last above named and provide that such substituted de-
vises [sic] and legatees shall receive said five-eighths of said residuary
estate of the survivor of us in such proportions as he may see fit."
The court viewed the provision as "a renunciation of any interest in the
residuary estate of the last survivor to the extent of five-eighths thereof'
on the part of the first wife, 0 and it affirmed the trial court's decision.
Although the parties to many will contracts will indicate clearly
that not all of their property is intended to be included, that intent may
not be so clear in many cases. Thus, interpretation may be a useful
judicial tool in avoiding conflicts where there is reasonable doubt as to
what property of the parties is covered by a contract. Interpretation
should not, however, be used to distort a clear intention of the parties
that all property they own is to be embraced in the provisions of a
contract.
76. Id at 155.
77. See id.
78. 194 Or. 257, 240 P.2d 1177 (1952).
79. Id at 268, 240 P.2d at 1182.
80. Id at 285, 240 P.2d at 1189.
1984]
13
Lilly: Will Contracts: Contract Rights in Conflict with Spousal Rights
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
2. Gifts Are Contemplated by the Contract
A will contract may expressly address the issue of whether and to
what extent the survivor may make gifts of property covered by the
contract. It is likely, however, that gifts will not be mentioned in the
contract. Therefore, courts will be called upon to determine whether
and to what extent contracts impliedly authorize gifts. Whether testa-
mentary "gifts" can be made is likely to be considered a question of
whether all property of a survivor is embraced within the terms of a
will contract.8' Whether gifts can be made inter vivos by a survivor is
usually the decisive issue in a case to recover property allegedly trans-
ferred in violation of contract terms.
The hypothetical estate plans discussed in the Introduction of this
writing grant a surviving spouse, during his lifetime, plenary control
over disposition of property embraced within the terms of the trust and
of the contract; by hypothesis, that is all property of both spouses.
Therefore, a survivor who remarried certainly could make inter vivos
gifts to a second spouse, and, although remarriage of the survivor may
not have been contemplated by the original spouses, a literal view of
the survivor's power would permit an inter vivos gift of all of the prop-
erty to a second spouse.
In In re Estate of Beauchamp,82 the Court of Appeals of Arizona
was called upon to interpret provisions of a property settlement agree-
ment incorporated into a divorce decree. The agreement required the
husband to leave his entire estate to the six children of the spouses. It
provided further that, subject to this limitation, property currently
owned or acquired in the future by the husband could be disposed of
inter vivos in any manner. The husband executed a will conforming to
the agreement. He remarried and later died without having executed a
new will. In a dictum, the court stated that "[h]e could have made a
gift to [his second wife] of all his property without violating the terms
of the agreement."83 Though a total gift might literally have been per-
missible, such a gift would clearly have violated the spirit of the agree-
ment. It is also clear, however, that literal compliance with the
agreement would have prevented the husband from making any testa-
mentary provision for his second wife.
A California appellate court had a problem similar to that in
81. See supra text accompanying notes 70-80.
82. 115 Ariz. 219, 564 P.2d 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
83. d. at 221, 564 P.2d at 910 (emphasis added).
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Beauchamp before it in Reid v. Asanovic.8 4  A property settlement
agreement incorporated into the divorce decree required the husband
to execute a will leaving all of the property he owned at his death to the
couple's daughter, or in equal shares to that daughter and any subse-
quent children he might have. He remarried and fathered a second
daughter. He conveyed two parcels of land to his second wife and
placed most of his remaining property in joint tenancy with her. His
last will specifically disinherited the daughter of his first marriage and
made his second wife his sole beneficiary.
After her father's death, the older daughter sued, seeking to have a
constructive trust for the benefit of herself and her half sister impressed
upon the property acquired by her stepmother. The trial court
awarded the two deeded parcels to the stepmother as reasonable gifts.
Half of the remaining property was also found to be a reasonable gift,
but the other half was awarded to the daughters equally because the
father's acts were found to have defeated the spirit and purpose of the
settlement agreement. The result was to award the stepmother nearly
sixty percent of the total property in issue.
Since only the stepmother appealed, the only issue before the ap-
pellate court was whether too much had been awarded to the daugh-
ters. In affirming the decision, the court stated in a dictum that the
father's "agreement necessarily implied a covenant 'not to make unrea-
sonable use of the property, as by conveying it all away so that the
named third party beneficiaries will receive nothing.' "85 At the least,
the Reidcase appears to be some evidence of a willingness on the part
of California courts to find implied provisions for reasonable gifts in
marital property contracts.
It cannot be determined from decided cases the extent to which
courts are willing to find reasonable gifts provisions implied: the ques-
tion apparently has not been a frequent judicial issue. Nor can it be
determined whether any court would find impermissible every gift re-
gardless of how reasonable it was in the prevailing circumstances.
There is support, however, for the proposition that conveyances of all
or nearly all of the survivor's estate to a subsequent spouse will be set
84. 224 Cal. App. 2d 632, 36 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1964).
85. Id. at 634, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (quoting Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 589, 349 P.2d
289, 300, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 620 (1960)). In Brewer the trial court had found specifically that the
spouses' estate plan contract permitted the survivor "the reasonable use and enjoyment of their
combined estates." Brewer, 53 Cal. 2d at 576, 349 P.2d at 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
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aside.8 6 One court described the situation this way:
What she in fact has done has stripped near all of the flesh from the
bones, leaving only a skeleton for testamentary disposition to [the
contract beneficiary]. This is a compliance in form, not in substance,
that breaches the covenant of good faith that accompanies every con-
tract, by accomplishing exactly what the agreement of the parties
sought to prevent.
It is understandable that a surviving wife, remarrying, may de-
sire, even in a brief period of time between remarriage and her death,
to give what she has to her successor husband. It is equally clear that
this may well have been the exact predictable change of circum-
stances against which her first husband sought to provide in agreeing
to the execution of a joint, mutual and reciprocal will. The duty of
good faith is an implied condition in every contract, including a con-
tract to make a joint will, and the transfers here violate such good
faith standard by leaving the will in effect but giving away the
properties which the parties agreed were to be bequeathed at the
death of both to a designated party. The contract to make a will,
once partially executed and irrevocable, is not to be defeated or
evaded by what has been termed "completely and deliberately de-
nuding himself of his assets after entering into a bargain."8"
A court may also limit the survivor's authority over property inter-
ests acquired upon a spouse's death to uses permitted by the terms of
their agreement. In Tiemann v. Kampmeier,8 8 the agreement permitted
the survivor to dispose of property it embraced "for his or her care and
support within his or her sound discretion."8 9 After his wife died, the
husband remarried and deeded property to his second wife. After his
death, third party beneficiaries of the agreement were successful in a
suit to have the property conveyed to them on the basis that no showing
was made that the transfers were made for his care and support.
Although it is clear that courts may properly find that reasonable
gifts to a second spouse may be implied from spousal agreements, they
should do so only on a case-by-case basis and by using a general meth-
odology appropriate for finding all implied terms. Courts should not
simply and routinely find that all spousal agreements impliedly permit
reasonable gifts to a second spouse, as that would merely be a subter-
fuge for a well articulated public policy.90
86. See eg., Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N.Y.S. 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935); Estate of
Chayka, 40 Wis. 2d 715, 162 N.W.2d 632 (1968), aft'd, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970).
87. Estate of Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d at 107-08, 176 N.W.2d at 564 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
B. SPARKs, supra note 6, at 52).
88. 252 Iowa 587, 107 N.W.2d 689 (1961).
89. d. at 592, 107 N.W.2d at 692 (emphasis added).
90. See infra text following note 188.
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3. Legacies Only Are Contemplated by the Contract
In relation to their property, spouses may clearly agree in a man-
ner which creates third party beneficiaries of property embraced by the
contract. On the other hand they may agree only that third party bene-
ficiaries shall have certain legacies made to them in a will conforming
to a contract. The difference is an important one when looked at in the
light of the rights of a second and surviving spouse. In the first situa-
tion the beneficiaries are owners of the property, but subject to the an-
tecedent rights of the contracting spouse who survives: the property is
not ranked as an asset of that spouse's estate when he dies. In the latter
situation the rights of the beneficiaries are the same as those of any
legatees of the survivor and are subject to priority rights of a second
and surviving spouse and of general creditors.
In re Hoyt's Estate9" illustrates the aforementioned principles.
New York spouses entered into a separation agreement which was later
incorporated into a Nevada divorce decree. In the agreement the hus-
band obligated himself to execute a will which would create a trust of
at least $1,500,000 for the benefit of his wife and their children or the
children's issue. After he remarried he executed a will conforming to
the agreement. His net estate at death amounted to approximately
$490,000, and his widow elected to take her statutory one-third share as
in intestacy. The children sought to establish themselves as creditors of
the estate, but relying on In re Tanenbaum's Estate92 the court held that
they were not creditors,
but that the agreement merely created an enforcible obligation to
make a testamentary provision for the benefit of the first wife of the
testator and his children after her death. The testator performed that
agreement. He undertook to do no more. The status of the claimants
is therefore that of legatees or beneficiaries under the will. As such
legatees or beneficiaries they take subject to the operation of the stat-
utes relating to testamentary dispositions, including the right of the
surviving widow to take her intestate share. . . . Their rights are
also subordinate to all true creditors of the estate. The widow of the
testator is therefore entitled to a one-third share of the net estate.
The respective interests of the claimants as legatees or beneficiaries
must be satisfied out of the balance.93
91. 174 Misc. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sur. Ct. 1940).
92. 258 App. Div. 285, 16 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1939), appeal denied, 258 App. Div. 1054, 17
N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1940).
93. In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. 512, 516, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107, 111 (Sur. Ct. 1940); see also Ver
Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939) (interpreting a non-
spousal contract for services). With Hoyt, compare Estate of Stewart, 69 Cal. 2d 296, 444 P.2d
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The Hoyt court appears to be correct in determining that the con-
tracting spouses intended that their children be beneficiaries of legacies
and not be owners of property rights. To have decided otherwise
would have frustrated the intention of the contractors as they could
have created property rights by using different language in the contract.
The children's probable expectations were crushed by the size of their
father's estate at death, not merely by the terms of the contract.
When legacies are intended, it is a clear duty of courts so to char-
acterize them. When contract terms are sufficiently ambiguous, it may
even be judicially legitimate to resolve doubt in a manner which gives
preference to the statutory rights of a second and surviving spouse. On
the other hand, when contract terms clearly create property rights in
third party beneficiaries, courts should not downgrade those rights
merely because they believe a surviving spouse should be provided for.
V. WILLS REVOKED BY REMARRIAGE, OMITTED SPOUSES, DOWER,
FORCED SHARES, ETC.
A variety of statutory rights has been erected in the law in an at-
tempt to assure some financial protection for a surviving spouse upon
the death of the other spouse. One of these rights, revocation of an
existing will by remarriage, is clearly directed to the protection of a
second or subsequent spouse. The others protect a second or subse-
quent spouse, but are also available to a first spouse.
It takes no citation of authority for the proposition that statutory
spousal rights may be rendered nugatory in a variety of ways by inter
vivos acts of a spouse or of a prospective spouse. For example, an
absolute gift of property to a third person is wholly effective as against
the other spouse unless at that time the spouse has a currently vested
interest in it.94
In the case of a will contract affecting property, the nature of the
interest it creates for its beneficiaries is the critical determinant of pri-
337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968) (acceptance of contract benefits creates an estoppel), discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 99-103.
94. Oklahoma law is typical in that, except for a compulsory support obligation, "neither
husband nor wife has any interest in the separate property of the other ...... OKLA. STAT. tit. 32,
§ 4 (1981).
[Tihe law makes it possible for a man during his life to give practically all of his property
to those to whom he owes no obligation, and deprive those of his own household of the
comforts of life; but this is only an incident to the right of husband and wife to own and
control separate property.
Farrell v. Puthofi, 13 Okla. 159, 163, 74 P. 96, 97 (1903). See generall, Lilly, supra note 2, at 15-24.
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orities as between them and a surviving spouse. If a spouse agrees by
contract only to make certain legacies, the rights of a surviving spouse
may properly have priority over those of the prospective legatees. 95 If,
on the other hand, a spouse's contract creates immediate property
rights in beneficiaries, those rights may have priority over the statutory
rights of a surviving spouse.
England 96 and a number of American states97 have statutes which
revoke in whole or in part a spouse's existing will in case of marriage or
remarriage. When no other will is made, the surviving spouse takes
from the decedent's estate as in intestacy.98
The opposing opinions in Estate of Stewart99 well illustrate the
problem facing a court when confronted with a will contract and a rev-
ocation statute. Stewart, his wife and his brother entered into a con-
tract respecting real property they owned equally as tenants in
common. They covenanted not to revoke their wills which gave a life
estate in the property to the survivors or survivor of them and then, on
death of the last survivor, to their respective children in fee. The
brother died first without issue, and Stewart was his heir. After the
wife died, survived by six children, Stewart remarried and later died
without having made a new will. A California statute 1°° revoked the
will as to his second spouse. She claimed that she was entitled to one-
half of the property as her intestate share. 10 The six children claimed
that she was entitled only to one-half of the interest he inherited from
his brother and that they were entitled to the other one-half plus the
entire interest Stewart originally owned and had contracted about for
their benefit.
In an opinion for the court, Chief Justice Traynor sustained the
children's claim. The court held that, by accepting the benefits of the
contract, Stewart was estopped from making a different disposition of
the property, which estoppel could not be avoided by a subsequent
marriage." In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice McComb argued
that "a contract to make disposition of property by will for all practical
95. See supra text following note 90.
96. Wills Act, 1837, 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 18.
97. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 394.090 (Michie 1984).
98. Eg., Estate of Stewart, 69 Cal. 2d 296, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal.Rptr. 545 (1968).
99. Id.
100. CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956).
101. See id § 223.
102. Estate of Stewart, 69 Cal. 2d 296, 299, 444 P.2d 337, 339, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1968)
(citing Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941)).
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purposes amounts to a testamentary disposition."'' 0 3 Since Stewart had
fully performed the contract, its obligation terminated, and, since all of
his property was transmitted through his will, it was, in the minority's
view, subject to the widow's claim.
The Uniform Probate Code includes an omitted spouse statute
which provides that such a spouse shall take from the decedent's estate
as in intestacy. 1°4 The Arizona statute10 5 came before the court in In re
Estate ofBeauchamp.t06 A property settlement agreement incorporated
into the divorce decree provided, in part, that "[h]usband further agrees
to execute a Last Will and Testament leaving his entire estate . . . to
the children of the marriage of the parties."'' 0 7 The husband executed a
will conforming to the agreement. He remarried and later died without
having executed a new will, and his widow claimed one half of his
estate as an omitted spouse.
The trial court determined that the children were entitled to their
father's entire estate. The Arizona Court of Appeals, however, found
that the widow was an omitted spouse and entitled to one half of the
estate as a priority over the children's claim for breach of contract,
which breach occurred because their father had failed to execute, after
his remarriage, a new will or codicil leaving them his entire estate. The
decision appears to be a correct one because the settlement agreement
called for future legacies. Had that agreement created in the children
immediate vested rights in the property of their father, their claim
should have been sustained.
Like results should occur in dower cases.'08 In Florida, the courts
have held that a widow's statutory dower right has priority over benefi-
ciary rights claimed under contracts calling for future legacies.'0 9 In
contrast is the result in the Iowa case of Baker v. Syfritt."0 The Iowa
103. 69 Cal. 2d at 303, 444 P.2d at 342, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 550 (McComb, J., dissenting).
104. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 (1982).
105. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2301 (1975).
106. 115 Ariz. 219, 564 P.2d 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
107. Id at 220, 564 P.2d at 909.
108. Generally, dower rights attach to real property of which the husband was "seized" during
coverture with his surviving wife. If a contract calls for future legacies, "seisin" is in the husband
and the property is subject to dower when he remarries. In case a contract immediately vests a
future interest in beneficiaries, the husband is not "seized" of an estate to which dower will attach
when he remarries.
For a general discussion of dower, see C. SCRIBNER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOWER (2d
ed. 1883).
109. See Barkley v. Barkley, 314 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1963); Tod v. Fuller, 78 So. 2d 713 (Fla.
1955). For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 125-31.
110. 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910).
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Supreme Court determined that husband and wife, in a joint will,
agreed to unite their separate estates, first for the lifetime use of the
survivor and then for third persons who would come into the legal title
and right of possession. Title to real property in their separate names
was, however, never changed. After the wife died, the husband remar-
ried and later died without having executed a new will. His widow
claimed her right to statutory dower'" of one third in value of all of the
real property her husband separately owned. The court determined
that the joint will was a contract which made the survivor a trustee and
divested him of any heritable estate in the property he had separately
owned. In denying the widow's claim, the court said: "[I]t must be
remembered that unless the husband has at some time during the mar-
riage relation held a heritable estate of some kind. . . in the property
in question no right of dower could attach thereto in the wife's favor.
The stream cannot rise higher than its source."11 2
The results in cases of other statutory rights, such as forced
shares,113 homestead,1 4 exempt property" 5 and family allowance,1'16
111. IOWA CODE § 3366 (1897) (currently IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.238 (West 1964)).
112. Baker, 147 Iowa at 62, 125 N.W. at 1003 (citations omitted).
113. A forced share statute typically grants a surviving spouse the right to elect to take in fee a
fractional interest in property inventoried as assets of the decedent spouse's estates at death. The
Oklahoma statute provides, in part, that "no spouse shall bequeath or devise away from the other
so much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive less in value than would
be obtained through succession by law ... ." OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 44 (1981). If a will contract
calls for future legacies only, property of the decedent subject to the future legacy is an asset of the
estate and is thus subject to the forced share right which has priority over legacies. If a will
contract immediately vests in beneficiaries a future interest in property, the affected property is not
inventoried as an asset of the decedent's estate and is thus not property to which the forced share
right attaches.
The Uniform Probate Code's "augmented estate" concept enlarges the estate of the decedent
for purposes of the spouse's forced share by including in it certain transfers made by the decedent
during marriage to the surviving spouse. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982). If, however, a
will contract immediately vests in beneficiaries a future interest in property prior to the marriage
to the surviving spouse, the property affected is not included in the augmented estate and is thus
not property to which the forced share right attaches. See id.
114. In a number of states, the homestead right is the right of a surviving spouse to possess and
occupy real property. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, §2 (1981); id. tit. 58, §311. Ifa decedent
spouse owned real property subject to future legacies because of a will contract, a devise of prop-
erty designated as homestead to a contract beneficiary would be subservient to the surviving
spouse's homestead right. See Meyer v. Security Nat'l Bank, 294 P.2d 572, 575 (Okla. 1955). If,
on the other hand, a will contract vests a remainder following the contractor's life estate in benefi-
ciaries, the property is not subject to a subsequent spouse's homestead right.
The Uniform Probate Code provides a homestead "allowance" expressed in dollars and is in
no way tied to ownership of real property. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-401 (1982). It "has priority
over all claims against the estate." Id (emphasis added). The promise of a future legacy is thus
subservient to it. The homestead right will be valueless only if there is no money or property in a
decedent's estate at death.
115. A right to exempt property may be stated in terms of categories of property without
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should be the same. Each of these rights can attach only to assets in-
cluded in a spouse's estate at his death. If a contract is treated as call-
ing for future legacies, the decedent's property is ranked as an estate
asset, and the statutory rights may have preference over legatees'
claims. But if a contract is treated as creating, prior to a second mar-
riage, vested property rights in third party beneficiaries, those rights
vest in possession in the beneficiaries on the spouse's death and are not
subject to claims based on statutes. The rights do not attach to prop-
erty to which the deceased spouse held only legal title.' 17
regard to value or in terms of a maximum value to be selected from categories of property. Com-
pare, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 311 (1981) (no limit on value) with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402
(1982) ($3,500 limit). In Oklahoma the property "is not to be deemed assets." OKLA. STAT. tit. 58,
§ 311 (1981). Under the Code, the exempt property allowance has priority over all claims against
the estate except the homestead and family allowances. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402 (1982).
Future legacies called for by a will contract are thus subservient to the exempt property right in
either case. If a will contract has vested equitable title to all of the specified property in benefi-
ciaries, there would be, under Oklahoma law, no exempt property at the time of the decedent's
death. In the same circumstance under the Code, a deficiency in the $3,500 allowance would exist
and could be made up if, but only if, there were assets in the estate available for that purpose. See
id.
116. In Oklahoma, an allowance for maintenance of the family has priority over all claims
against a decedent's estate except homestead, exempt property, funeral charges and expenses of
administration. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 314-315. Under the Uniform Probate Code "[t]he
family allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims but not over the homestead
allowance." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-403 (1982). In either case the allowance is preferred over
future legacies called for by a will contract, but in neither case can it be paid unless there are assets
in the estate otherwise sufficient for the purpose.
England and some Commonwealth members have expanded the courts' power to provide a
maintenance for the family out of a decedent's estate. In Dillon v. Public Trustee of New Zea-
land, 1941 A.C. 294 (P.C.), the Privy Council was called upon to apply § 33 (I) of New Zealand's
Family Protection Act of 1908, which stated:
If any person (hereinafter called the "testator") dies leaving a will, and without making
therein adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of the testator's wife,
husband, or children, the court may at its discretion, on application by or on behalf of
the said wife, husband, or children, order that such provision as the court thinks fit shall
be made out of the estate of the testator for such wife, husband, or children.
Dillon, 1941 A.C. 294, 294 (P.C.). Following the death of his first wife, the decedent entered into
an agreement with his two sons to devise his real property in equal shares to three of his children.
His last will, executed after his remarriage, was in accord with the agreement. The Council held
that the estate was subject to additional provision for the widow in spite of the agreement. In a
dictum, however, it approved a statement of the lower court "that if Henry Dillon, senior, had
transferred his lands to his children during his lifetime, the Family Protection Act could not oper-
ate upon them." Id. at 302 (dictum).
In England, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, ch. 63, simi-
larly allows a court to make additional provision for a decedent's family. Section II of the Act
specifically applies to contracts to leave property by will: in limited circumstances a provision can
be given preference over a will clause carrying out a contract which calls for future legacies. The
Act does not, however, apply in cases where a contract has vested equitable title in beneficiaries.
117. Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 42, 54, 143 So. 694, 697 (1932).
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VI. THE ROLE OF NOTICE OF A CONTRACT
Whether a second spouse has antenuptial notice or is in ignorance
of the existence of a pre-existing contract binding the property of the
other spouse is a matter often deemed relevant by courts in determin-
ing priority of rights among claimants to that property. Notice, or lack
of it, is frequently said to be an important criterion to be utilized by a
chancellor in determining whether and to what extent sound equitable
discretion warrants a denial or a grant of specific performance of a con-
tract.118 In other instances, the matter of notice is considered to be
either immaterial to or the controlling determinant of the outcome in a
case seeking to establish priority of spousal rights.
A. Notice-Immaterial or Controlling?
Kansas appears to be the only state which has squarely held that
notice, or lack of it, is wholly immaterial in the determination of the
rights of a surviving spouse in property affected by a contract. Two
cases must be mentioned.
In the early case of Dillon v. Gray," 9 the Grays entered into an
oral contract for services with their daughter and son-in-law, the Dil-
Ions. Although the opinion does not set out the terms of the contract,
the court says that "the farm and everything owned by [the Grays]
should, upon the death of himself and his wife, become the property of
the [Dillons]. ' '"2 The Dillons performed their agreement until after
the death of the wife when Gray sold the farm and notified them to
leave. Subsequently, Gray remarried and executed a will leaving all of
his property to three of his sons, except for bequests of twenty-five dol-
lars to Mrs. Dillon and $200 to her daughter. The second wife was
joined as a defendant in an action brought by the Dillons for specific
performance of the contract. The trial court decree ordered perform-
ance. In reviewing the court's refusal to make a finding on notice, the
Supreme Court of Kansas stated: "Notice to the wife of [the Dillons']
claim was not required in order to bind her. At her husband's death
she acquired no interest in property held by him which in equity be-
longed to others. Her marriage did not make her a purchaser."''
118. See infra text accompanying notes 135-75.
119. 87 Kan. 129, 123 P. 878 (1912).
120. Id at 130, 123 P. at 878.
121. Id at 135, 123 P. at 880.
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The second case, In re Estate of Davis, 122 concerns a property set-
tlement agreement entered into by Texas spouses and affecting lands
situated in Kansas. It provided that if the husband died before any sale
of the Kansas lands, his interest in them "will pass" to his first wife "for
her use and . . she shall have the net income therefrom" until her
death or remarriage, and that, upon her death or remarriage, "the re-
mainder in said lands shall pass in fee simple to the bodily heirs" of the
husband according to Texas law.123  After the divorce, the husband
remarried and executed a will leaving one parcel of Kansas land sub-
stantially in accord with the agreement's provisions. A second parcel
was devised, however, to his second wife. The Kansas trial court con-
strued the agreement as vesting equitable title to all Kansas lands in the
first wife and their two daughters subject only to the right of sale, and,
since that right was unexercised, the court ordered specific perform-
ance. In affirming the decree, the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized
that, although specific performance is not a matter of right but of eq-
uity, the second wife's lack of knowledge of the agreement is not a basis
for denial of its enforcement according to the principle established in
the Dillon case. 124
In Florida, a widow without notice is permitted to claim dower. In
Fuller v. Tod125 the supreme court reversed a decree which included a
finding, without admission of evidence, that decedent's widow had no
notice of her husband's contract with his former wife. On remand the
trial court properly found that the widow had no notice. The supreme
court affirmed its decree awarding her one-third of her husband's estate
as dower.1
26
The notice issue under Florida law came before the Fifth Circuit
in Barkley v. Barkley.27 The husband's will left his entire personal
estate to his second wife; she, however, elected to take dower. In a
declaratory judgment action, the court held that the contract with the
divorced first wife was ineffective to cut off dower rights of the second
122. 171 Kan. 605, 237 P.2d 396 (1951).
123. Id. at 609, 237 P.2d at 401.
124. See id at 612, 237 P.2d at 403.
125. 63 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1953).
126. Tod v. Fuller, 78 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1955). Although dower has been abolished in Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.111 (West 1976), the dower statute in effect in the time of 7"odsaid, in part,
that "in all cases the widow's dower shall be free from liability for all debts of the decedent ...
1945 Fla. Laws ch. 22,847, § I.
127. 314 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 20:197
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss2/3
WILL CONTRACTS
surviving wife who married the decedent without notice of the contract.
The court said:
Although it has not been clearly decided by the Florida Courts that
actual or constructive notice on the part of the widow would bar her
dower rights in the face of an agreement to make a will and the ac-
tual execution of a will, it is clear that the court has held that where
there is no notice of the existence of such a contract or a will executed
under it thepromisee of the contract, who is the beneficiary of such
will, may have his rights restricted where the widow claims her dower
right. 128K
The Kansas and Florida cases are not inconsistent. The key dis-
tinction lies in the nature of the rights created in the spouses' contract
for third party beneficiaries. In the Davis case, the Kansas court con-
strued the husband's settlement agreement as immediately vesting eq-
uitable title to his property in his first wife and their children, subject
only to his right of sale.129 In such a case, upon the husband's death
that property embraced within the agreement is not ranked as an asset
of his estate, for it now belongs legally and equitably to the benefi-
ciaries. The courts in the Barkley case impliedly construed the settle-
ment agreement as calling for future legacies to the third party
beneficiaries. That agreement provided, in part, that "the parties...
shall execute a good and valid will, which. . . shall will, bequeath, and
devise the entire beneficial interest in all property. . ." to their sons.
1 30
In such a case, no property interest immediately vests in the benefi-
ciaries; the husband's property is an asset of his estate and, as such, is
subject not only to the priorities of the statutory rights of his surviving
spouse but also to the claims of his creditors. 3 1 The Florida courts
apparently have had no opportunity to determine the effect of lack of
notice in a case where a contract immediately vests equitable title in
third party beneficiaries.
It can readily be seen that under usual property rules, lack of no-
tice, as the Kansas courts have determined, is immaterial where vested
equitable rights are created by a spousal contract. The danger lies not
in the matter of notice but in courts' misconstruing the rights created by
a contract.1 32 It is clear, on the other hand, that a state may have a
public policy which limits the rights of spouses to contract with respect
128. Id at 192 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
130. Barkley, 314 F.2d at 189 (emphasis added).
131. See supra text following note 90.
132. See supra text following note 93.
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to their property in a manner which abridges the rights of a subsequent
spouse. A state may also use notice or lack of notice of the contract as
the determinant factor in the subsequent spouse's quest to obtain those
rights.133 The distinction between the promise of a future legacy and a
vested property interest should not be lost. Whether notice or lack of
notice of a contract is a permissible factor in a chancellor's determina-
tion of the extent to which specific performance of such a contract is
warranted is another issue altogether. 134
B. Discretionary Enforcement in Equity and the Role of Notice
When it appears to a beneficiary that the provisions of a will con-
tract have not been met, the beneficiary may seek specific performance
of the contract in equity. Technically, the remedy sought may more
properly by called "quasi-specific performance"1 35 or "relief in the na-
ture of specific performance."' 136 Since the promisor is dead, his per-
formance cannot be compelled. Instead, it is performance by others, as
trustees, 137 that is sought.
Before a court sitting in equity will consider whether specific per-
formance is appropriate relief, however, it must be satisfied that its ju-
risdiction is properly invoked. In will contract cases, as in any case in
equity, traditional equity jurisdiction prerequisites must be established.
For example, an equity court has no jurisdiction if the party seeking
relief has an adequate remedy at law. Thus, where a party can be ap-
propriately compensated by damages for breach of contract, the equity
court will lack jurisdiction, and the party can only seek relief at law.' 38
Once jurisdictional prerequisites are established and the case is
properly one of equitable cognizance, "a contract to devise property is
valid and enforceable unless superior equities have intervened."'' 39
The equities here in favor of the surviving spouse, by hypothesis, must
be based on after-acquired rights stemming from a marriage which oc-
curred after the parties entered into a valid contract.' 40 Those rights
133. See infra text accompanying note 190.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 135-75.
135. Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 53, 113 P.2d 495, 499 (Dist. Ct. App.
1941).
136. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 108, 184 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944).
137. See Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 448, 45 P. 710, 711 (1896).
138. See id. at 454, 45 P. at 713.
139. In re Estate of Arland, 131 Wash. 297, 299, 230 P. 157, 158 (1924).
140. Spousal rights were discussed previously. See supra text accompanying notes 94-117.
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are proper considerations in equity, 14 1 and, because of those rights, spe-
cific performance is not assured.
But the question whether relief should be granted or denied in a par-
ticular case addresses itself peculiarly to the conscience of the chan-
cellor, and, before a plaintiff entitles himself to it, many
considerations enter and are to be weighed. The specific perform-
ance must not be objectionable upon other grounds. The contract,
therefore, must be definite and certain, and the remedy asked for
must not be harsh or oppressive, or unjust to innocent third parties,
or against public policy, or equity will with propriety withhold its
assistance. 142
In addition, will contracts are subject to special scrutiny: "To be sure,
the court would be more strict in examining into the nature and cir-
cumstances of such agreements than any others, and would require
very satisfactory proofs of the fairness and justness of the
transaction." 14
3
Although courts state the principles to guide the chancellor's exer-
cise of discretion in general terms, the study of will contract cases
which affect subsequent spouses reveals that one factor is the dominant,
if not the only determinant of how a chancellor will exercise his discre-
tion in denying or granting specific performance. That factor is
whether the spouse had, or did not have, antenuptial notice of the pre-
existing contract. 144
Two California cases145 illustrate the critical role of notice in eq-
uity cases. In Sargent v. Corer 4 6 an oral adoption contract was proved
wherein Littlefield agreed to surrender parental rights with respect to
his three minor children in consideration of the Coreys' promise "that
upon the death of the survivor of them the [children] 'should and
would succeed' to the property then owned or thereafter acquired" by
the Coreys. 147 After his wife died, Corey remarried and fathered a
daughter. He executed and deposited with a bank a deed of gift con-
veying certain real and personal property to his second wife and their
daughter, which deed was delivered upon his death. In an action
141. See, e.g., Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 (1896); Ver Standig v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939).
142. Owens, 113 Cal. at 450-51, 45 P. at 712.
143. Rivers v. Executors of Rivers, 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 190, 195-96 (1811).
144. For a discussion of notice in a different context, see supra text accompanying notes 119-
34.
145. Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941); Sargent v. Corey, 34
Cal. App. 193, 166 P. 1021 (1917).
146. 34 Cal. App. 193, 166 P. 1021 (1917).
147. Id at 194, 166 P. at 1022.
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brought by the Littlefield children, the trial court found that the widow
had no notice or knowledge of the contract until after her husband's
death, and it denied enforcement of the contract. In affirming the deci-
sion on appeal, the court determined that Owens v. McNalp 48 was
controlling precedent which dictated that "such a contract wiln not be
specifically enforced where the man marries after making it, leaving his
wife in ignorance thereof, as marriage under such circumstances is suffi-
cient to warrant the court in withholding equitable relief."'149
In Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen I5 the spouses had entered into a writ-
ten separation agreement which provided, in part,
that upon the death of the first of them that all of the property of
either or both of them will go to the survivor, and upon the death of
such survivor will go to the four children of these parties ... and
both of said parties agree to make a will which will carry out the
above provision and which shall provide that ... all of the property
... upon the death of such survivor will go to the four children of
these parties .... 15 1
One day after his wife died, Sonnicksen entered into a written agree-
ment with a woman who was to become his wife eighteen months later.
In consideration of her providing him nursing care, he agreed that he
would convey to her his home and the adjoining lot at the moment
before his death. After he died, the widow tried to obtain the promised
property in the probate proceedings and in a separate action. Both at-
tempts failed, except that she was allowed a homestead. 15 2 The four
children then brought a quiet title suit and succeeded in the appellate
court in obtaining full legal title to all of the property on estoppel
grounds.1 53 Commenting on the equities, the court said:
All the equities support the judgment of the trial court upon [the
issue of title and right of possession]. There is no equity in the claim
of the [widow]. She entered into a contract with [Sonnicksen] follow-
ing the death of [iis first wife] which was designed to aid [him] in a
repudiation of the contract with his former wife and this was done
... with full knowledge of theformer contract and of the rights of the
[children] to the property in litigation.15 4
Surviving spouses who had no notice of pre-existing contracts
148. 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 (1896).
149. Sargent v. Corey, 34 Cal. App. 193, 195, 166 P. 1021, 1022 (1917) (emphasis added).
150. 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941).
151. id at 49, 113 P.2d at 497. The appellate court notes that conforming mutual wills appar-
ently were not made by the parties. Id, 113 P.2d at 498.
152. Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 55, 113 P.2d 495, 497 (1941).
153. Id, at 49, 59, 113 P.2d at 497, 503.
154. Id at 56, 113 P.2d at 501 (emphasis added).
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which may be deemed to call for future legacies 155 have prevailed over
beneficiaries in cases involving adoption, 15 6 property settlement 57 and
services'58 contracts. They have also prevailed in estate plan cases
based on mutual wills'59 or on a separate written contract.1"'
A surviving spouse has prevailed even though she had notice of
the pre-existing contract. In Boner's Administratrix v. Chesnut's Execu-
tor'6 1 the court had to determine priority of rights based on a hus-
band's antenuptial contract with his second wife and on mutual
contractual wills of himself and his first wife. Each will left the testa-
tor's estate to the other spouse for life; the remainder, after numerous
similar bequests, was to be divided between the heirs of both. The an-
tenuptial contract provided that the second wife would receive only
$25,000 from her husband's estate. The husband's last will acknowl-
edged the widow's antenuptial contract rights, but it left the residue to
a charity instead of to his and his first wife's heirs. Suggesting, but not
deciding, that the widow would have been entitled to dower except for
the antenuptial contract, the court found strong equities in her favor in
spite of her actual knowledge of the mutual wills. Noting that the mu-
tual will beneficiaries had "no moral or legal claim upon the testators,"
the court added that "[i]t would be most unjust and inequitable to say
that collateral beneficiaries should take the entire estate of Mr. Chesnut
and leave his widow with nothing . .. 162 The widow received the
amount allowed by the antenuptial contract, but the will beneficiaries
prevailed over the charity as to the residue.
The above cases dealt with actual notice. Courts generally have
not faced the question of whether and under what circumstances con-
structive notice of a pre-existing contract may be imputed to a second
spouse. In Wides v. Wides'Executor1 3 the court rejected an argument
that a divorce decree gave notice of an incorporated settlement agree-
ment. The court said that, as a recorded instrument, the decree gave no
155. See supra text following note 90.
156. See Sargent v. Corey, 34 Cal. App. 193, 166 P. 1021 (1917); Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho
359, 218 P. 641 (1923).
157. See Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944).
158. Cf. Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444,45 P. 710 (1896) (spouse prevailed over contracting
party); Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939) (spouse
prevailed over contracting party).
159. See Patecky v. Friend, 220 Or. 612, 350 P.2d 170 (1960).
160. See In re Estate of Arland, 131 Wash. 297, 230 P. 157 (1924).
161. 317 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1958).
162. Id at 870.
163. 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944).
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notice to persons not parties to the litigation, and that the widow was
not negligent in failing to investigate the judgment record.1 64  Wides
and a paucity of cases on point may suggest that courts are averse to
denying spousal rights where constructive notice is the only basis on
which that may be done.
C. Lack of Notice and a Will Conforming to the Contract
The foregoing cases were in equity because a decedent's last will
did not conform to a contract's requirements and because beneficiaries
could not obtain the relief they wanted in probate proceedings or at
law. If lack of notice is the key to spousal recovery in equity, a ques-
tion arises as to the role of notice in circumstances in which equity's
intervention is neither sought nor available.
Suppose that a decedent's last will is in conformity with a contract
calling for future legacies either because no statute revokes it upon the
spouse's marriage 165 or because it was executed after remarriage.1 66 In
such a case, the beneficiaries have no need for relief in the nature of
specific performance because the contract's requirements for them have
been met. Nor can specific performance be of any help to the surviving
spouse. If the spouse has any rights, they are necessarily based on pro-
tective statutes167 and are to be claimed in probate proceedings.
If notice or lack of notice is only a criterion used to guide the chan-
cellor in exercising his discretion, an anomaly in the law appears to
emerge. In case of a will not conforming to a contract's call for future
legacies, beneficiaries' full recovery in equity will depend upon whether
the spouse did or did not have antenuptial notice of the contract. In
case of a conforming will, equitable discretion does not come into play,
and beneficiaries' full recovery will depend solely upon the priorities
accorded to spousal rights by the protective statutes. Typically, those
statutes do not mention notice nor make the spouse's right to the pro-
tections dependent upon lack of notice. 168 Thus the spouse's claims
164. Id at 113, 184 S.W.2d at 584. But cf. Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 42, 143 So. 694 (1932)
(antenuptial knowledge of the existence of a recorded contract may give constructive notice of its
contents to the subsequent spouse).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
166. Execution of a conforming will after remarriage prevents the new spouse from being able
to claim as an "omitted spouse." See In re Estate of Beauchamp, 115 Ariz. 219, 564 P.2d 908
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). Beauchamp is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 105-07. Failure
to execute a new will after remarriage may constitute a breach of the contract. See, e.g.,
Beauchamp, 115 Ariz. at 221, 564 P.2d at 910.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 94-117.
168. The Uniform Probate Code contains several sections providing protection for a surviving
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based on the statutes should be allowed regardless of notice; notice is
immaterial. 69 Use of this reasoning to deny full statutory benefits to
the spouse in non-conforming will cases in equity because he or she
had notice is wholly unwarranted discrimination.
The Boner case 170 appears correct in awarding a Kentucky widow
the benefit afforded by her antenuptial contract in spite of the fact that
she had notice of the contractual wills of her husband and his first wife.
The widow did not claim dower because the antenuptial contract called
for a lesser amount. But for the contract, the court notes, she would
have been entitled to dower.17 1 It thus may be implied from Boner that
dower is to be allowed in spite of notice. Since the court earlier had
decided that a widow was entitled to dower where there was no no-
tice,' 72 the decisions make notice immaterial in Kentucky and are in
accord with the Kentucky dower statute, 173 which does not make the
dower right dependent upon lack of notice.
Only one case has been found in which a widow who had notice of
a pre-existing contract calling for future legacies was denied any partic-
ipation in her husband's estate. In Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen,7 4 decided
on estoppel grounds, the court hinted that the widow had acted in con-
cert with her husband in an attempt to defraud the third party benefi-
ciaries of their contract rights. Although the result may be acceptable,
the court's reasoning is somewhat unsatisfactory. A clear finding of
fraud would have helped to justify the result.
It has earlier been observed that Kansas regards notice as wholly
immaterial when a spouse claims rights in face of a contract which had
immediately vested property rights in third party beneficiaries.175
There, the beneficiaries prevailed. Notice is just as immaterial when a
spouse claims rights in face of a contract calling for future legacies.
Here, however, the spouse should prevail in all cases, regardless of no-
tice, on the basis of priority of rights. Fortunately, up to this time
judges have not worked an injustice on surviving spouses, as there ap-
spouse. They are typical in that no protection therein is denied to a surviving spouse on the basis
that the surviving spouse had antenuptial notice of an existing contract affecting the decedent
spouse's property. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201(a), -301(a), -401 to -403 (1982).
169. See supra text following note 118.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
171. 317 S.W.2d at 869.
172. See Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944).
173. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.020 (Michie 1984).
174. 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 150-
54).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24.
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pears to be no case where notice of a contract has been used as the sole
basis for denying the priority of spousal rights. Future courts should be
careful to recognize that the statutory rights protecting surviving
spouses are not made dependent upon lack of notice of a future lega-
cies contract.
VII. PUBLIC POLICY
Although a number of courts have flirted with public policy in
cases dealing with will contracts affecting spousal property, only one
court appears to have held that a specific contract violated public pol-
icy, and that holding is an alternative one.
Bedal v. Johnson" is a complex case which deals with a contract
that provides not only for an adoption but also for making the adoptee
the sole heir. In 1868 Alexander orally agreed with Johnson and his
first wife that he would give up his daughter whom they would adopt
and make their heir so that she would have all property they might
leave at their deaths. In 1874 Alexander threatened to take the child
away, since the adoption had not occurred. Thereupon the parties en-
tered into a novation of the original agreement and in 1875 Johnson
procured the enactment of a special act of the Legislative Assembly of
Idaho which authorized the adoption and stated, in part, that the child
"is hereby made the lawful and legitimate heir of said Orville P. and
Rosanna C. Johnson, the same as if she were their natural child, and
shall be treated as and have the same rights as an heir as if she were
their natural child. ... "I After his first wife died, Johnson remar-
ried and fathered a son; neither his second wife nor his son survived
him. He married a third time and subsequently transferred most of his
property to his third wife. His last will, which was offered for probate
after the adopted daughter instituted an action based on the contract,
left her fifty dollars and left the remaining estate to his widow and de-
ceased son. The court says that the original agreement is invalid be-
cause contracts for the adoption of children were against public policy
in 1868.17 The 1874 novation, originally invalid, became a binding
contract upon the enactment of the 1875 special act. 179 But the court
also says:
176. 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923).
177. Id at 370, 218 P. at 643.
178. Id at 382, 218 P. at 648 (adoptions not authorized under common law).
179. See id at 387, 218 P. at 650.
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It should be remembered that we are discussing the contract not
merely as one of adoption, but one providing for sole heirship. We
shall not here go into the question as to whether the contract operates
as a restraint of marriage, since we are of the opinion that inasmuch
as the contract for sole heirship would deprive any children subse-
quently born of their natural rights of inheritance, and would like-
wise deprive the parents of their right to dispose of property by gift
or devise to subsequently born or adopted children or to a spouse of
either on a subsequent marriage, such a type of contract offends
against the common instincts of natural loyalty, affection and duty
and is therefore contrary to the public good and welfare.1
80
The court's final comment on public policy related to its decision that,
because of the contract, Johnson could not legitimately disinherit his
adopted daughter: "It contravenes no principle of public policy and
invokes no unjust, harsh or inequitable rule against the [third wife] to
so construe the contract as to give [the daughter] a child's share in the
estate of both the Johnsons."'' A number of courts have made state-
ments about public policy in contract cases of this sort, but they have
not based their decisions on that ground.
Several courts have addressed the question left open in the John-
son case: whether such a contract constitutes a restraint on remarriage.
Uniformly, they suggest that the original parties to the contracts must
have contemplated a possible remarriage, otherwise the contracts
would operate as an impermissible restraint on marriage, and would be
against public policy.'" 2 One court has said that the law reflects a pol-
icy of disfavor upon the failure of a spouse to provide for the surviving
spouse. 8 3 Another court has said, on the other hand, that "[a] contract
to make joint wills which may operate to deprive a second spouse of
her statutory share is not contrary to the public policy of Illinois."' 4
Mississippi has even taken the position that husband-wife estate plan
contracts are to be encouraged.18 5
180. Id at 384, 218 P. at 648 (alternative holding); accord Gall v. Gall, 19 N.Y.S. 332 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1892); Patecky v. Friend, 220 Or. 612, 350 P.2d 170 (1960).
The court in Bedal also held that "the contract to make respondent the sole heir of the John-
sons cannot be enforced because its enforcement would be harsh, offensive and unjust to appel-
lant, who married him without any knowledge of the agreement." 37 Idaho at 387, 218 P. at 649
(alternative holding).
181. 37 Idaho at 388-89, 218 P. at 650.
182. See Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 (1896); Gall v. Gall, 19 N.Y.S. 332 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1892); Patecky v. Friend, 220 Or. 612, 350 P.2d 170 (1960).
183. See Estate of Stewart, 69 Cal. 2d 296, 300, 444 P.2d 337, 340, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548
(1968).
184. Keats v. Cates, 100 Ill. App. 2d 177, 192, 241 N.E.2d 645, 652 (1968).
185. See Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 42, 53, 143 So. 694, 697 (1932).
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Faced with a sole heirship contract in In re Estate of
Beauchamp,186 the Arizona court thought that a settlement agreement
calling for a will leaving all property the father owned at his death to
the six children of the marriage did not violate public policy. That the
father could freely alienate property during his lifetime distinguished
the agreement from a contract, which would be against public policy,
"where a person has irrevocably agreed to divest himself of all control
of all his property of every nature whatever which he at the time pos-
sesses, and also of all he may subsequently acquire."'18 7
It is not surprising that courts are reluctant to rely on public policy
due to its ephemeral nature. As one court has observed:
We are not unmindful of the fact that a Court should not lightly
strike down a contract on the ground that it is contrary to what is
called public policy. That is an uncertain, indefinite term, and whenjudges come to apply the doctrine they must take care that they do
not trespass upon the right to make contracts as parties see proper, so
long as they do not violate some principle or policy of law.' 88
It seems clear on the other hand that a properly and well articu-
lated public policy would serve as a far more legitimate basis on which
to limit or restrict contracts that affect future spouses and children than
do the somewhat artful and attenuated bases relied on in some of the
decided cases.
The foregoing discussion has focused on two types of contracts
which create different rights in third party beneficiaries and affect
spousal property rights. One type vests immediate property rights in
beneficiaries and in some cases purports to extend coverage to property
acquired in the future. The other type promises the right to a future
legacy of property owned at death.8 9 A legislature could change the
nature or enlarge the scope of coverage of substantive spousal protec-
tions 9 ' and fit the two types of contracts into a new scheme of protec-
tions in any way it believed socially desirable. It could even make the
availability of a protection dependent upon lack of notice of a pre-
existing contract.
Where the legislature does not act, however, the courts may con-
186. 115 Ariz. 219, 564 P.2d 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); see supra text accompanying notes 104-
07.
187. Id at 221, 564 P.2d at 910 (citing Baltimore Humane Impartial Soc'y v. Pierce, 100 Md.
520, 60 A. 277 (1905)).
188. Baltimore Humane Impartial Soc'y v. Pierce, 100 Md. 520, 526, 60 A. 277, 278-79 (1905).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 94-117.
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tribute stability and reduce litigation by establishing as public policy
"rules of construction" for determining the effects of the two types of
contracts. In case there is no remarriage, a court should enforce both
the future legacy and the immediate vesting contracts according to their
terms, there being otherwise no supervening rights to require a different
result.
The courts could construe future legacy contracts as contemplating
remarriage and as giving the beneficiaries only a type of expectancy in
that property bargained for in their behalf. Third party benefits would
thus be subservient to the statutory protections available to surviving
spouses, although the promisor could not exercise direct control over
the benefits. 91
Two positions are desirable in regard to an immediate vesting con-
tract. The contract should be construed to vest immediately in benefi-
ciaries the interest bargained for in property the promisor owned at the
time of the contract. Insofar as a contract purports to include an inter-
est in property the promisor acquires or amasses in the future, the con-
tract could be construed, again, as contemplating remarriage and as
giving the beneficiaries only a type of expectancy. In case of remar-
riage, the third party benefits would be subservient to the statutory pro-
tections available to surviving spouses. If a court adopted these
positions, it would in effect be recognizing that a decedent spouse had
two "estates." The first estate would be comprised of all property
owned by the decedent at the time of the second marriage. This estate
would be fully subject to the contract and would become the property
of the beneficiaries in accordance with the contract terms. The second
estate would be comprised of property acquired by the spouse after
marriage to the subsequent spouse. This estate would first be subject to
the statutory protections accorded a surviving spouse and to issue of
that marriage and otherwise subject to the contract for third party ben-
eficiaries. Although such a policy would complicate estate matters for
common law property jurisdictions, reference to community property
law principles could be utilized to delineate the estates. The policy has
the advantage of giving some recognition to the claims of all persons
legitimately interested in a decedent spouse's estate.
191. See Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 388-89, 218 . 641, 650 (1923) (discussed supra in
text accompanying note 181).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Will contracts serve a number of useful functions, including
spousal estate planning, settlement of property rights in case of divorce,
facilitation of adoption and compensation for future services. These
contracts may, however, give rise to a conflict between the rights of
third party beneficiaries and the rights of a spouse acquired by a con-
tracting party after a contract has been entered into. In fact, some con-
tracts may have the effect of creating estate preferences for third party
beneficiaries so that there is little or no estate available to the surviving
spouse. In resolving the conflict, some courts have confused property,
estates and contract law or relied upon less than pellucid reasoning.
In some cases the conflict has been avoided. Courts may rely on a
presumption that joint or mutual wills do not presume a contract or
that the introduced evidence of a contract does not meet the clear and
convincing evidence standard. Courts may find that disputed property
is not embraced by a contract or that a contract permits reasonable gifts
of property.
A critical distinction perceived by some courts is whether a will
contract merely promises future legacies to third party beneficiaries or
immediately vests property rights in them. Statutes creating rights for
surviving spouses may properly be interpreted as giving those rights
priority over the rights of third party beneficiaries of a future legacies
contract. The priority is reversed in cases where the contract immedi-
ately vests rights in beneficiaries. Although notice or lack of notice of a
pre-existing will contract has been stated by courts to be critical in de-
termining priority between the surviving spouse and the third party
beneficiaries, notice or lack of it is, in fact, immaterial because the stat-
utory spousal rights are not made dependent upon it.
Public policy has not generally been utilized by courts to resolve
the conflict, although there are occasional dicta about it. Although re-
cent enactments have enlarged the estate subject to the forced share
rights of surviving spouses, legislatures still have an opportunity to for-
mulate public policy to resolve the conflicts between third party benefi-
ciaries and surviving spouses arising out of will contracts which bind
the contractor's assets. Until legislatures act, courts can contribute sta-
bility and reduce potential litigation in the area by adopting uniform
rules of construction which effectuate the probable intentions expressed
in will contracts.
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